diff --git a/src/permission/classify.ts b/src/permission/classify.ts
index b956966b8..e0c2ccba2 100644
--- a/src/permission/classify.ts
+++ b/src/permission/classify.ts
@@ -256,11 +256,37 @@ function pathLikeTokens(command: string): string[] {
   return out;
 }
 
+// AgentId-addressed fleet continuation verbs (see the CL-9362 note on
+// callTargetsRestricted below).
+const AGENT_ID_TARGETED_FLEET_TOOLS = new Set([
+  "close_agent",
+  "interrupt_agent",
+  "send_input",
+  "resume_agent",
+  "read_agent_trace",
+]);
+
 export function callTargetsRestricted(
   call: ToolCall,
   isRestricted: (path: string, isWrite: boolean) => boolean,
 ): boolean {
   const name = canonicalToolName(call.name);
+  // Fleet verbs that address workers by opaque agent id (`target`), never by
+  // path (CL-9362). There is nothing path-shaped here for isRestricted to
+  // judge, so agentId-to-worktree resolution deliberately does not live in
+  // this function and the gate's auto-allow `!restricted` guard stays
+  // vacuous for these calls — intentionally, not by oversight. Path
+  // restriction is enforced where paths are actually touched: inside the
+  // target worker, whose own gate binds restriction judgments to its process
+  // cwd (bindRestrictedToProcessCwd in gate.ts). Resolving ids to worktrees
+  // here would duplicate that enforcement at a layer with no session access,
+  // so these calls always report "not restricted", exactly like
+  // spawn_agent/wait_agents. (The full fleet verb list lives in
+  // subagent/authority.ts as FLEET_VERBS; the five single-`target`
+  // agentId-addressed verbs are named above — spawn_agent, wait_agents,
+  // list_agents, and search_agents take no single-agent `target` argument
+  // and already fall through to false below.)
+  if (AGENT_ID_TARGETED_FLEET_TOOLS.has(name)) return false;
   if (name === "run_shell")
     return commandTargetsRestricted(stringArg(call, "command"), isRestricted);
   if (name === "apply_patch") {
diff --git a/src/permission/permission.test.ts b/src/permission/permission.test.ts
index f6749b4bc..7bb19ca06 100644
--- a/src/permission/permission.test.ts
+++ b/src/permission/permission.test.ts
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import {
   classifyTool,
   buildRequests,
   isAutoAllowedShellCall,
+  callTargetsRestricted,
 } from "./classify.js";
 import { createPermissionGate } from "./gate.js";
 import { APPROVAL_TIMEOUT_RESULT_TEXT } from "./decline-markers.js";
@@ -1596,6 +1597,66 @@ describe("createPermissionGate", () => {
     expect(asked).toBe(tools.length);
   });
 
+  // CL-9362: agentId-targeted fleet calls address workers by opaque session
+  // id (`target`), never by path — there is nothing path-shaped for
+  // callTargetsRestricted to judge, so the gate's auto-allow `!restricted`
+  // guard is intentionally vacuous for them. Path restriction is enforced
+  // where paths are actually touched: inside the target worker, whose own
+  // gate binds restriction judgments to its process cwd.
+  test("auto mode auto-allows agentId-targeted fleet calls even when every path is treated as restricted", async () => {
+    let asked = 0;
+    const gate = createPermissionGate({
+      approvals: [],
+      requestApproval: async () => {
+        asked++;
+        return { allow: false };
+      },
+      interactive: true,
+      skipPermissions: false,
+      reactorGated: false,
+      auto: true,
+    });
+    const calls: ToolCall[] = [
+      { id: "c", name: "close_agent", arguments: { target: "worker-1" } },
+      { id: "c", name: "interrupt_agent", arguments: { target: "worker-1" } },
+      {
+        id: "c",
+        name: "send_input",
+        arguments: { target: "worker-1", message: "continue" },
+      },
+      {
+        id: "c",
+        name: "resume_agent",
+        arguments: { target: "worker-1", message: "continue" },
+      },
+      {
+        id: "c",
+        name: "read_agent_trace",
+        arguments: { target: "worker-1" },
+      },
+    ];
+    for (const call of calls) {
+      const verdict = await gate.evaluate(call);
+      expect(verdict.allowed).toBe(true);
+    }
+    expect(asked).toBe(0);
+    // Same-gate in-bounds write: this fixture is not a restricted worktree.
+    const inBounds = await gate.evaluate({
+      id: "c",
+      name: "write_file",
+      arguments: { path: "notes.md" },
+    });
+    expect(inBounds.allowed).toBe(true);
+    expect(asked).toBe(0);
+    // The carve-out is intentional, not an oversight: even an isRestricted
+    // that reports everything restricted does not flag these calls — they
+    // carry agent ids, not paths.
+    const alwaysRestricted = () => true;
+    for (const call of calls) {
+      expect(callTargetsRestricted(call, alwaysRestricted)).toBe(false);
+    }
+  });
+
   // manage_tasks's handler has no side effect — the task list is mutated
   // earlier by the director, before this tool ever executes — so denying it
   // cannot undo anything. It auto-allows unconditionally, not just in auto