PRISM performs only passive lookups, but the platform itself takes user input, talks to a couple of dozen third-party APIs, and serves a dashboard that people put on the public internet. Reports about any of that are welcome.

This is a one-person project, so support means the latest minor plus the one before it. Please reproduce on the current release before reporting.

Do not open a public issue for a security problem.

• Email entropq2@gmail.com, or
• Open a private advisory: Security tab, then Report a vulnerability

Useful to include:

1. What the issue is and what an attacker gets out of it.
2. Steps to reproduce, or a minimal proof of concept.
3. Version or commit hash.
4. Your own read on severity, and a suggested fix if you have one.

What to expect back: I read reports within a week and reply with an assessment once I have reproduced it. Fixes for anything high or critical go out as soon as they are ready, usually within a couple of weeks. I would rather say that than promise a number I cannot keep. If a report has gone quiet for more than two weeks, send a reminder.

Tell me how you want to be credited in the changelog, or say if you would rather not be.

In scope:

• Backend: web/app.py, web/security.py, the modules under modules/
• Frontend under frontend/
• The browser extension under extension/
• Docker and docker-compose deployment artefacts
• Webhook delivery and signing

Out of scope:

• Bugs in the third-party services PRISM queries (Shodan, VirusTotal, Censys and the rest). Report those upstream.
• Anything that needs a maliciously modified deployment, such as an attacker-controlled .env.
• Findings with no working proof of concept.
• Denial of service that needs sustained traffic or a privileged network position.

PRISM ships with these on:

• Header-only API auth. X-API-Key or Authorization: Bearer. Keys in the query string are rejected.
• No anonymous access. With no API_KEYS configured the API answers 503 unless ALLOW_ANON_API=true is set deliberately.
• CORS closed by default. ALLOWED_ORIGINS has to list origins explicitly. There is no wildcard fallback.
• Per-principal scan isolation. A scan belongs to the principal derived from the API key, and reads across principals return 404.
• SSRF guards. validate_url_not_private for user-supplied URLs, _resolve_all_public for webhook hosts. The webhook guard checks every address a hostname resolves to and refuses to send if any of them is private, or if the name does not resolve at all.
• HMAC-signed webhooks when WEBHOOK_SECRET is set, in X-Prism-Secret.
• Response headers. X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy.
• Rate limiting. 200/day and 60/hour globally, tighter per route, via slowapi. Keyed on the peer address unless proxy headers are explicitly trusted.
• Proxy headers off by default. TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true trusts X-Forwarded-* only from the addresses in FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS.
• Input validation. Length cap and shell metacharacter rejection in validate_target, UUID check on scan IDs.
• Non-root container. The image runs as uid 1000. CI fails if that stops being true.
• DISABLE_DOCS=true hides /docs, /redoc and /openapi.json.

For anything reachable from outside your machine:

1. Generate long random values for API_KEYS. Comma-separate them for multiple tenants.
2. Set ALLOWED_ORIGINS to the exact frontend origins.
3. Set WEBHOOK_SECRET and check X-Prism-Secret on the receiving end.
4. Set DISABLE_DOCS=true.
5. Put it behind a reverse proxy that terminates TLS.
6. Set TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true only when PRISM is not directly reachable, and pin FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS to the proxy.
7. Set TRUSTED_HOSTS to the hostnames the backend should answer on.
8. Treat PRISM_UI_API_KEY as public. It ships to the browser, so never put a server-side secret there.
9. Restrict outbound egress where you can. PRISM calls a lot of third parties.
10. Put scan_data/ and module_cache/ on storage you control. If you bind-mount them, chown -R 1000:1000 so the non-root container can write.
11. Update the image and run pytest -q after dependency upgrades.

PRISM is for lawful, authorised OSINT. See the legal notice in README.md. If you find the platform being used for surveillance, harassment or doxxing, tell me and I will act on it.