Pure PHP file sanitizer and scanner for uploaded files. It strips metadata where practical, rewrites selected file types into safer forms, and detects suspicious or malicious content such as XSS-style payloads, risky embedded markup, active PDF content, and dangerous archive entries.
- Re-encodes supported image formats to remove metadata and ancillary chunks
- Sanitizes HTML and SVG using strict policy-based cleanup
- Scans PDFs for active content, including JavaScript hidden inside compressed/encoded streams
- Scans OOXML documents for risky content such as macros, ActiveX, and external relationships
- Recursively scans ZIP archives, including nested archives, with configurable safety limits
- Scans audio files for suspicious embedded payloads and removes metadata where practical
- Scans video files for suspicious embedded payloads and applies best-effort metadata cleanup
- Supports sanitize-always mode for best-effort cleaning even when risky content is detected
- Accepts input as a file path, raw string/binary payload, or base64 (including
data:URIs) - Produces a cross-platform-safe filename via a dedicated name sanitizer
- Streams input in bounded chunks instead of loading whole files into memory
- Pure PHP implementation with no shell access, SSH, or external binaries required
composer require sytxlabs/filesanitizerRequires PHP >=8.1 with the exif, gd, zip, and fileinfo extensions enabled. The zlib extension is recommended: without it, compressed PDF streams cannot be decoded and scanned.
2.0 rewrote the pipeline around streaming I/O and contains breaking changes:
Scanner\PatternScannerwas removed; useScanner\CompositeScanner(the default) orScanner\ArchiveScanner.Support\MimeDetectormoved toMimeDetector\MimeDetectorand implementsContracts\MimeDetectorInterface.- The
FileSanitizerconstructor is now(mimeDetector, scanner, input, output, sanitizerCandidates, nameSanitizer). Each argument may be an instance or a class-string; the sanitizer list moved from the 3rd to the 5th position. ScannerInterfaceandSanitizerInterfacedeclare a constructor taking an optional stream (and output) plus an options array.ScannerInterfaceadditionally requiressupports().- Archive limits (
maxArchiveDepth,maxArchiveEntries,maxExpandedBytes) are passed via the scanner's$optionsarray instead of positional constructor parameters. SanitizeReporthas a newunchangedproperty, which is also part oftoArray()/ JSON output.- HTML/SVG sanitizing no longer builds a DOM, so the serialized output can differ byte-wise from 1.x even though the policy is the same.
- PDFs with streams whose filter chain cannot be decoded are now rejected fail-closed.
For development and tests:
composer install
composer test # PHPUnit: unit, integration, and fuzz tests
composer stan # PHPStan static analysis (level 8)
composer cs # code style check (Pint)<?php
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
$result = $sanitizer->process(__DIR__ . '/upload.svg');
if (!$result['scan']->safe) {
foreach ($result['scan']->issues as $issue) {
echo $issue->code . ': ' . $issue->message . PHP_EOL;
}
exit(1);
}
echo 'Sanitized file written to: ' . $result['sanitize']->outputPath . PHP_EOL;You can sanitize raw payloads directly without creating input files yourself.
<?php
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
$html = '<div onclick="x()"><script>alert(1)</script>ok</div>';
$result = $sanitizer->processString($html, 'upload.html', true);
echo $result['sanitizedData'];processString() also accepts optional filenameHint and optional mimeType as the 2nd and 5th argument.
If mimeType is null, FileSanitizer detects it from the payload data.
It also supports Python-style bytes literal input like b"...\\xFF..." or b'...\\x00...'.
For raw binary bytes, use processBinary():
<?php
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
$bytes = file_get_contents('php://input');
$result = $sanitizer->processBinary($bytes, null, null, true, null);For base64 payloads (including data:*;base64,... input):
<?php
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
$payload = 'data:image/svg+xml;base64,' . base64_encode('<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>');
$result = $sanitizer->processBase64($payload, 'upload.svg', true);
echo $result['sanitizedBase64'];processBase64() also accepts optional filenameHint and optional mimeType as the 2nd and 5th argument.
If mimeType is null, it first uses Data-URI MIME (if present), otherwise detects from decoded data.
An attacker-controlled filename can be cleaned on its own, independent of file content, via sanitizeName(). It produces a name that is safe to store or serve back on Windows, Linux, and macOS at once: path separators are stripped, only an allow-listed character set survives (ASCII letters/digits/space/. _ - ( )), Windows-reserved device names (CON, PRN, COM1, ...) are prefixed, and the result is bounded to 255 bytes.
<?php
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
echo $sanitizer->sanitizeName('../../etc/passwd'); // 'passwd'
echo $sanitizer->sanitizeName('report<script>.txt'); // 'report_script_.txt'process() and the string/binary/base64 variants apply the same sanitizer to the output filename automatically.
When sanitizeAlways is enabled, FileSanitizer will attempt best-effort sanitization even if risky content is detected during scanning.
This is useful when you want to:
- always strip metadata where possible
- always rewrite supported files where possible
- keep findings for review without immediately rejecting the upload
<?php
use SytxLabs\FileSanitizer\FileSanitizer;
$sanitizer = new FileSanitizer();
$result = $sanitizer->process(__DIR__ . '/upload.pdf', null, true);Best-effort sanitization does not guarantee a full structural rebuild for complex formats such as PDF, audio, or video containers.
FileSanitizer currently supports scanning and/or sanitizing the following file types.
- Images
- JPEG
- PNG
- GIF
- WebP
- Documents and markup
- HTML
- SVG
- TXT and text-like files
- DOCX
- XLSX
- PPTX
- Archives
- ZIP
- Nested ZIP archives
- Audio
- MP3
- WAV
- OGG
- FLAC
- M4A
- AAC
- Video
- MP4
- MOV
- WebM
- MKV
- AVI
FileSanitizer combines format-aware scanning with best-effort sanitization.
The scanner looks for suspicious patterns and risky structures such as:
- inline JavaScript-style payloads
- dangerous HTML or SVG constructs
- active PDF actions, including ones hidden inside compressed or encoded PDF streams
- suspicious archive paths and nested archive abuse
- risky embedded strings in audio and video containers
- macros, ActiveX, and external relationships in OOXML files
Supported sanitizers attempt to reduce risk by:
- re-encoding images
- removing unsafe HTML and SVG elements and attributes
- stripping metadata where practical
- rewriting selected file formats into safer forms
- applying best-effort cleanup to complex containers
PDFs are streamed in bounded chunks rather than loaded whole, so scanning memory usage stays flat regardless of file size.
- A raw pass matches action name objects (
/JavaScript,/Launch,/AA,/RichMedia,/XFA,/SubmitForm,/GoToR,/Encrypt), decoding PDF name hex-escapes (#XX) first so an obfuscated name like/J#61vaScriptis still recognised. - Every
stream ... endstreamblock is located, its filter chain resolved from the stream dictionary, and decoded (FlateDecoder,AsciiHexDecoder,Ascii85Decoder,RunLengthDecoder,LzwDecoder, chainable for filter arrays) so JavaScript hidden inside a compressed object stream is still found; decoded content is also checked for embedded executables, archives, and nested PDFs. - A stream whose filter chain cannot be fully decoded is rejected fail-closed, except image-codec/XObject streams, which are skipped rather than decoded since they cannot carry an object dictionary.
ZIP scanning is recursive and designed to detect suspicious content without using shell extraction.
Current guards:
- maximum nesting depth: 3
- maximum scanned entries per archive: 1000
- maximum expanded bytes scanned: 25 MB
- suspicious path detection for entries such as
../evil.txtor absolute paths
The limits are configurable through the scanner options, for example new ArchiveScanner(null, ['maxArchiveDepth' => 2, 'maxArchiveEntries' => 500, 'maxExpandedBytes' => 10_000_000]).
HTML and SVG sanitization is policy-based and removes risky constructs instead of relying on simple tag stripping.
Highlights:
- removes
script,iframe,object,embed,form, and other disallowed elements - removes all
on*event handlers - removes
javascript:,vbscript:,file:, and unsafedata:URLs - removes hostile CSS such as
expression(),@import,url(),behavior:, and-moz-binding - removes SVG active content such as
script,foreignObject, animation elements, external media,image, anduse
FileSanitizer includes best-effort support for common audio formats.
-
Detects suspicious embedded payloads such as:
<scriptjavascript:- inline event handler patterns like
onclick= <iframedata:text/html- embedded PHP tags
-
Removes metadata where practical:
- MP3: ID3v1 and ID3v2 tags
- WAV: selected metadata chunks such as
LIST,INFO, andID3 - OGG, FLAC, M4A, and AAC: conservative best-effort textual payload cleanup
Audio sanitization is best-effort and does not transcode or fully rebuild complex media containers. No shell tools, SSH access, or external binaries are required.
FileSanitizer includes best-effort support for common video containers.
-
Detects suspicious embedded payloads such as:
<scriptjavascript:- inline event handler patterns like
onload= <iframedata:text/html- embedded PHP tags
-
Applies conservative container cleanup where practical:
- MP4 and MOV: attempts to remove selected metadata atoms such as
udta,meta, andilst - AVI: removes selected metadata chunks such as
INFO,JUNK, andIDIT - WebM and MKV: applies conservative best-effort textual payload cleanup
- MP4 and MOV: attempts to remove selected metadata atoms such as
Video sanitization is best-effort and does not transcode or fully rebuild media containers. Without external tools such as FFmpeg, full structural video rewriting is intentionally out of scope.
The PHPUnit suite (composer test) covers essentially the entire library — over 99% line coverage, with CI failing the build below 95% — including:
- nested ZIP detection
- path traversal detection inside ZIPs
- HTML sanitization rules
- SVG sanitization rules
- PDF action detection, including decoding of chained stream filters (Flate, ASCIIHex, ASCII85, RunLength, LZW)
- audio metadata stripping
- video file scanning for embedded payloads and metadata stripping
- string, binary, and base64/data-URI input handling
- cross-platform filename sanitization
- bounded-memory streaming behavior, including chunk-boundary edge cases, on large inputs
tests/FuzzTest.php is part of the default suite and fuzz-tests the library's hand-rolled byte-level parsers — the PDF stream decoders, the SVG/HTML tokenizers, PdfScanner, and the WAV/AVI/MP4 chunk walkers — since those are exactly the places most likely to mishandle adversarial or malformed input. It combines pure random bytes (for the decoders, which must tolerate arbitrary garbage) with point-mutations of known-good fixtures (for the structured formats, where purely random bytes rarely get close enough to the real format to exercise interesting near-valid branches), asserting that nothing throws, hangs, or otherwise misbehaves. The run is seeded (override with the FSZ_FUZZ_SEED environment variable) so a failure is reproducible.
Static analysis runs via PHPStan at level 8 (composer stan, config in phpstan.neon, src/ only).
FileSanitizer is a pure PHP package focused on safe, practical, best-effort sanitization.
- PDF sanitization is a best-effort and not a full PDF rebuild
- OOXML files are scanned for risky content but are not fully rewritten
- audio sanitization removes metadata where practical but does not transcode files
- video sanitization is best-effort and does not perform full re-encoding or container rebuilding
- complex media formats may still require deeper inspection in high-security environments