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refactor(shell): share transparent command peeling #1166

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bcc92d4
refactor(shell): share transparent command peeling
TheGreatAxios Sep 25, 2026
93e514f
fix(shell): consume clustered env value shorts inside -S
TheGreatAxios Sep 26, 2026
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62 changes: 62 additions & 0 deletions src/permission/classify-security.test.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -67,6 +67,45 @@ describe("isAutoAllowedShellCall — sensitive-path arguments", () => {
});
});

describe("clustered shell command options", () => {
test("classifies clustered command payloads like canonical command payloads", () => {
for (const options of ["-c", "-lc", "-xec", "-cc", "-cache"]) {
const call = shellCall(`bash ${options} "echo x > .env"`);
expect(autoShellRuleForCall(call)?.name).toBe("file-mutation");
expect(autoShellRuleForCall(call)?.effect).toBe("deny");
}
});

test("classifies interpreter-specific and conservative alphabetic clusters", () => {
for (const [shell, options] of [
["zsh", "-yc"],
["dash", "-Vc"],
["ksh", "-Gc"],
["bash", "-zc"],
["bash", "-lc"],
["sh", "-ec"],
]) {
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(`${shell} ${options} "echo x > .env"`)),
).toMatchObject({ name: "file-mutation", effect: "deny" });
}
});

test("classifies complete adjacent-fragment payloads", () => {
for (const command of [
`bash -c "echo x "'> .env'`,
`bash -lc 'echo x '" > .env"`,
`bash -xec "echo x"' > .env'`,
`bash -cc echo" x > .env"`,
]) {
expect(autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(command))).toMatchObject({
name: "file-mutation",
effect: "deny",
});
}
});
});

describe("isAutoAllowedShellCall — environment dump", () => {
test("does not auto-allow printenv (full env dump)", () => {
expect(isAutoAllowedShellCall(shellCall("printenv"))).toBe(false);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -716,6 +755,19 @@ describe("env-assignment shell commands force ask in auto mode", () => {
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("env -i FOO=bar npm start"))?.name,
).toBe("env-assignment");
expect(autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("env -i FOO=bar ls"))?.name).toBe(
"env-assignment",
);
});

test("env -u HOME with a following assignment still asks", () => {
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("env -u HOME FOO=bar ls"))?.name,
).toBe("env-assignment");
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall("env -u HOME LD_PRELOAD=./evil.so ls"))
?.name,
).toBe("env-assignment");
});

test("stacked short flags (env -iS) with an embedded assignment ask", () => {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -780,6 +832,16 @@ describe("content inside an env -S payload never receives a weaker tier than it
);
expect(rule?.name).toBe("dependency-install");
});

test("trailing env terminal flags remain arguments to split payloads", () => {
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(`env -S "rm -rf /" --version`))?.name,
).toBe("recursive-rm");
expect(
autoShellRuleForCall(shellCall(`env -S "npm install left-pad" --help`))
?.name,
).toBe("dependency-install");
});
});

describe("upload-shaped network shell commands force ask in auto mode", () => {
Expand Down
225 changes: 225 additions & 0 deletions src/shell/run-shell-authz.test.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -101,6 +101,121 @@ describe("recursive rm detection", () => {
});
});

describe("clustered shell command options", () => {
const payload = `cat $'.envrc'`;

for (const [shell, options] of [
["zsh", "-yc"],
["dash", "-Vc"],
["ksh", "-Gc"],
] as const) {
test.skipIf(Bun.which(shell) === null)(
`${shell} ${options} executes the following argument as a payload`,
() => {
const result = Bun.spawnSync([shell, options, "printf clustered-ok"]);
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0);
expect(result.stdout.toString()).toBe("clustered-ok");
},
);
}

test("reconstructs double-quoted payloads with canonical and clustered options", () => {
for (const options of ["-c", "-lc", "-xec", "-cc", "-cache"]) {
const command = `bash ${options} "cat \\$'.envrc'"`;
expect(expandShellSubjects(command)).toEqual({
subjects: [command, payload],
opaque: false,
});
}
});

test("supports repeated command options for sh-compatible interpreters", () => {
for (const shell of ["bash", "sh", "zsh", "dash", "ksh"]) {
const command = `${shell} -cc "find /"`;
expect(expandShellSubjects(command).subjects).toContain("find /");
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(command)).toMatch(
/Open-ended shell search blocked/,
);
}
});

test("inspects interpreter-specific and conservative alphabetic clusters", () => {
for (const [shell, options] of [
["zsh", "-yc"],
["dash", "-Vc"],
["ksh", "-Gc"],
["bash", "-zc"],
["bash", "-lc"],
["sh", "-ec"],
]) {
const openEnded = `${shell} ${options} "find /"`;
expect(expandShellSubjects(openEnded).subjects).toContain("find /");
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(openEnded)).toMatch(
/Open-ended shell search blocked/,
);
expect(
runShellAuthzBlockReason(`${shell} ${options} "rm -rf /"`),
).toMatch(/Destructive command blocked/);
}
});

test("reconstructs the complete shell word from adjacent fragments", () => {
const cases = [
{ command: `bash -c "rm "'-rf /'`, payload: "rm -rf /" },
{ command: `bash -lc 'rm '"-rf /"`, payload: "rm -rf /" },
{ command: `bash -xec "fi"'nd /'`, payload: "find /" },
{ command: `bash -cc fi"nd /"`, payload: "find /" },
{
command: `env -u -c bash -c "fi"'nd /'`,
payload: "find /",
},
];

for (const { command, payload: expectedPayload } of cases) {
expect(expandShellSubjects(command)).toEqual({
subjects: [command, expectedPayload],
opaque: false,
});
}
});

test("does not treat true lookalikes as command options", () => {
for (const command of [
`bash script-c "find /"`,
`bash --rcfile "find /"`,
`bash -y+c "find /"`,
`bash -c1 "find /"`,
`bash script.sh -c "find /"`,
]) {
expect(expandShellSubjects(command)).toEqual({
subjects: [command],
opaque: false,
});
}
});

test("hard-denies complete adjacent-fragment payloads", () => {
for (const command of [
`bash -c "rm "'-rf /'`,
`bash -lc 'rm '"-rf /"`,
`bash -xec "fi"'nd /'`,
`bash -cc fi"nd /"`,
]) {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(command)).toMatch(
/Destructive command blocked|Open-ended shell search blocked/,
);
}
});

test("hard-denies clustered command payloads like canonical command payloads", () => {
for (const options of ["-c", "-lc", "-xec", "-cc", "-cache"]) {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`bash ${options} "find /"`)).toMatch(
/Open-ended shell search blocked/,
);
}
});
});

describe("stdin-blocking with quote-aware tokenizeSegment", () => {
test("unquoted readers with no file operand are blocked", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason("cat")).toMatch(/standard input/);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -388,6 +503,35 @@ describe("authz hard-deny peels glued and trailing env -S forms", () => {
);
});

test("split payloads own trailing terminal-looking arguments", () => {
const cases = [
{
command: `env -S "find ." --help`,
subject: "find . --help",
reason: openEnded,
},
{
command: `env -S "rm -rf /" --version`,
subject: "rm -rf / --version",
reason: destructive,
},
{
command: `env -S "npm install left-pad" --help`,
subject: "npm install left-pad --help",
},
];

for (const { command, subject, reason } of cases) {
expect(expandShellSubjects(command)).toEqual({
subjects: [command, subject],
opaque: false,
});
if (reason !== undefined) {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(command)).toMatch(reason);
}
}
});

test("G7: soft-allow non-catastrophic rm inside -S is not hard-denied", () => {
expect(
runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "rm -rf node_modules"`),
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -433,6 +577,71 @@ describe("authz hard-deny peels glued and trailing env -S forms", () => {
);
});

test("transparent time options and end-of-options expose hard-denied utilities", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`time -p find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`time -- find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`/usr/bin/time -o report find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`/usr/bin/time -ao report find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`time -f %e find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
});

test("clustered env and timeout value options expose hard-denied utilities", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -iu PATH find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`timeout -vs KILL 1 find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
});

test("valid GNU timeout durations expose hard-denied utilities", () => {
for (const duration of [
".5s",
"1",
"1e3",
"1e3s",
"0x1p4",
"2m",
"3h",
"4d",
"inf",
"infinity",
]) {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`timeout ${duration} find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
}
});

test("env value operands are parsed before terminal modes", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -u --help find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -C --version find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
});

test("env continues assignment parsing after end-of-options", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -- FILE=x find .`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -i -- FILE=x find .`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
});

test("terminal wrapper modes do not peel their operands as commands", () => {
for (const command of [
"command --help find .",
"command -p -v find",
"command -pv find",
"env --help find",
"nice --help find",
"timeout --help find",
]) {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(command)).toBeUndefined();
}
});

test("G13: empty/whitespace -S payload with trailing utility is hard-denied", () => {
// Runtime still executes the trailing utility; do not opaque-drop it.
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S " " find /`)).toMatch(openEnded);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -463,6 +672,22 @@ describe("authz hard-deny peels glued and trailing env -S forms", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S -v cat`)).toMatch(stdinHang);
});

test("G15b: clustered env value shorts inside -S consume the flag operand", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "-iu PATH find /"`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "-iu PATH rm -rf /"`)).toMatch(
destructive,
);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "-iC /tmp find /"`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -iu PATH find /`)).toMatch(openEnded);
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "-i -u PATH find /"`)).toMatch(
openEnded,
);
});

test("G16: env -S quoted rm flags still hard-deny catastrophic targets", () => {
expect(runShellAuthzBlockReason(`env -S "rm '-rf' '/'"`)).toMatch(
destructive,
Expand Down
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