Key rate limiter on client IP and add verifiedTokens cleanup#2157
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felladrin
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July 22, 2026 20:38
- Key the rate limiter on client IP (from X-Forwarded-For rightmost entry, X-Real-IP, or socket.remoteAddress) instead of the client- rotatable argon2 hash, which allowed bypassing the limit by rotating the token each request - Validate extracted IPs with net.isIP() to prevent unbounded key injection from malformed headers - Add periodic cleanup (every 60s) to verifiedTokens Set to prevent unbounded memory growth - Pass IncomingMessage through handleTokenVerification to both server hooks so the IP can be extracted Note: users behind the same IP will now share a rate-limit bucket.
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Summary
Fixes #2126. The rate limiter was keyed on a client-rotatable argon2 hash — each request generated a fresh hash with a new random salt, so the rate limiter never actually limited. The
verifiedTokensSet also grew unbounded with no cleanup.Changes
getClientIp()to extract the real client IP from the rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry (the one our proxy appended), X-Real-IP, or socket.remoteAddress. Rate limiter now keyed on IP instead of token. IPs validated withnet.isIP()to prevent unbounded key injection.IncomingMessageparameter, passes it through toverifyTokenAndRateLimit.handleTokenVerification.Verification
npm run lintpasses cleanNote
Users behind the same IP will now share a rate-limit bucket (10 req/10s).