Fixing cryptocurrencies references - #3
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jklein24
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May 26, 2026
## Summary Documents the server-side error codes added across the AT-5324 error-audit epic so SDKs and integrators have a way to learn them other than triggering them in production. Cross-cutting observation #3 in `error-audit/FRESH_REVIEW.md` flagged the gap. ## Codes documented | Code | HTTP | Source PR | Ticket | |---|---|---|---| | `WALLET_SIGNATURE_MISSING` | 401 | lightsparkdev/webdev#27767 | AT-5342 | | `WALLET_SIGNATURE_MALFORMED` | 401 | #27767 | AT-5342 | | `WALLET_SIGNATURE_BODY_MISMATCH` | 401 | #27767 | AT-5342 | | `WALLET_SIGNATURE_INVALID` | 401 | #27767 | AT-5342 | | `UMA_NOT_FOUND` | 404 | #27758 (closed) | AT-5345 (cancelled) | | `METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED` | 405 | #27747 | AT-5325 | | `CONFLICT` (newly surfaced for duplicate `platformCustomerId`) | 409 | #27766 | AT-5348 | `NOT_IMPLEMENTED` (501) was already documented; no change needed. The 502 codes (`VASP_UNREACHABLE`, `VASP_INVALID_RESPONSE`) were initially included but have been removed — AT-5345 was cancelled and the server doesn't emit them. `UMA_NOT_FOUND` is in the same boat (originally from AT-5345) but is being left in for now pending a separate decision. ## Files changed - `openapi/components/schemas/errors/Error401.yaml` — adds the four `WALLET_SIGNATURE_*` codes - `openapi/components/schemas/errors/Error404.yaml` — adds `UMA_NOT_FOUND` - `openapi/components/schemas/errors/Error409.yaml` — adds `CONFLICT` - `openapi/components/schemas/errors/Error405.yaml` (new) — `METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED` - `openapi/paths/customers/customers.yaml` — adds 405 response, expands 409 description to mention `CONFLICT` - `openapi/paths/receiver/uma/receiver_uma_{receiverUmaAddress}.yaml` — expands 404 description - `openapi.yaml` + `mintlify/openapi.yaml` — re-bundled ## Constraints honored - No error-envelope redesign — only enum extensions. - No new endpoints, no semantic changes. - `make build` regenerated the bundle; `make lint` passes (warnings only, all pre-existing). ## Test plan - [x] `make build` succeeds - [x] `make lint` passes (no new errors, pre-existing warnings only) - [x] Bundle includes all new codes (`grep -E "WALLET_SIGNATURE|UMA_NOT_FOUND|METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED|CONFLICT" openapi.yaml`) - [ ] Mintlify renders the updated error tables without blank-page regressions Related: epic AT-5324, `error-audit/FRESH_REVIEW.md`.
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…ents (#742) ## Summary Fan-out to multiple clients already worked; **replay on reconnect didn't**. This adds it. The demo drives one hardcoded customer, so every connected panel is watching the same account and should see every delivery. There is no per-client filtering — `pushEvent` walks all subscribers — and that part is verified below. The gap was that a client only ever saw events that arrived *while it was connected*, so an `EventSource` auto-reconnect after a network blip silently dropped whatever landed in the gap. ### What changed - Every frame now carries an `id:` (a per-process sequence number). `EventSource` echoes the last one back as `Last-Event-ID` when it reconnects, and the stream replays events after that point. - **A fresh client replays nothing.** It presents no id, and replaying history would render old deliveries as if they had just arrived — the panel timestamps entries on receipt. - **Subscribe happens before replay**, so a delivery landing mid-replay queues behind it rather than slipping between the two steps. - The connect handshake comment reports `clients=N`. `EventSource` ignores comment frames; it shows up in `curl -N .../api/webhooks/stream` when you want to confirm every panel is attached. ### Verified Three concurrent clients, one delivery each time, with a disconnect and a reconnect in the middle: ``` A handshake: : connected clients=1 B: clients=2 C: clients=3 deliver #1 → A [1] | B [1] | C [1] ← every client, no filtering B disconnects; #2 and #3 land while it is away A [1,2,3] | C [1,2,3] ← survivors unaffected B reconnects with Last-Event-ID: 1 B replayed: [2,3] ← exactly what it missed D connects fresh: [] ← no invented history deliver #4 → A [1,2,3,4] | C [1,2,3,4] | B [2,3,4] | D [4] ``` Signature verification is untouched; the replay path only re-sends events that already passed it. ### Limits (documented in the module) - The bus is **per server process**. With multiple replicas, only the instance that received a delivery can fan it out to its own clients — a shared channel (Redis pub/sub) would be needed. - The ring buffer holds the **last 50** events, so a client away longer than that loses the overflow. Stacked on #730. ### Update: catch-up must not duplicate either Self-review caught a flaw in the first push. Subscribe-then-replay avoids gaps but **double-sends**: an event landing between `subscribe` and the replay loop goes out live *and* again from the backlog. Replay-then-subscribe has the opposite bug (it loses that event). The stream now subscribes immediately but **holds** live events, replays the backlog, then flushes the held ones the replay didn't cover. Verified by reconnecting from `Last-Event-ID: 1` while deliveries stream in: ``` client saw: 2,3,4,5,6 duplicates: none gaps : none (2..6 as expected) ``` Also added `webhookEvents.test.ts` covering the bus contract: fan-out to every subscriber, survival of a subscriber that throws, the `seq`/`eventsSince` replay windows, and the ring dropping the overflow a long-gone client can no longer catch up on. **69 tests** total (was 60). ### Update: the stream was readable by any site Second self-review finding, and a more serious one. `/api/webhooks/stream` is unauthenticated and carries whatever Grid delivered — transaction ids, amounts, and `counterpartyInformation`, which per Grid's schema can include a counterparty's **name, birth date and nationality**. That is the same exposure `GET /api/webhooks/events` was deleted for earlier in this stack; the SSE replacement inherited it. An `EventSource` opened by another site is now refused (`Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site` → 403), so a page on someone else's origin can't attach to a panel running on your machine: ``` same-origin (our own panel) → 200 no header (curl / scripts) → 200 cross-site (another website) → 403 ``` **This is not access control**, and the code comment says so: anyone who can reach the host can still read the stream, which behind an ngrok tunnel means anyone with the URL. Gating it properly — a session cookie, or not exposing it past localhost — belongs on the pre-prod list next to proxy customer-scoping. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pjqydq34z8DBK1kBrioXK2
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