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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe PR upgrades fhe.rs integrations and BFV presets. It changes encryption witness calculations and CRISP ballot checks, regenerates circuit constants, and moves protocol and crypto configuration identifiers to v2. It also updates benchmark results and report generation. ChangesBFV upgrade and protocol rollout
Benchmark result refresh
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Feature Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Benchmark comparisons remain misleading, and a normal artifact push can fail when the destination branch contains a legacy pair. Correct the report and artifact publication path before merging, or explicitly accept the replacement workaround. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 46.55% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 58 functions across 44 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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In `@circuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/crisp_verify_gas.json`:
- Line 30: Update run_benchmarks.sh and generate_report.sh so a standalone
integration_summary.json is used only when it belongs to the current benchmark
run; when the embedded integration_summary is null, remove or invalidate any
stale sibling summary and report integration timings as unavailable.
- Around line 3-5: Update the benchmark report-generation flow around
generate_report.sh so null verify-gas values remain N/A in both verify-gas and
total-gas columns; publish numeric values only when gas extraction succeeds.
Preserve the existing benchmark data and avoid changing runtime behavior.
In `@crates/zk-prover/tests/common/node_fold_witness.rs`:
- Around line 227-228: Update share_encryption_for_slot to encode the C3
plaintext using the parameter Arc held by dkg_pk, ensuring
Plaintext::validate_for accepts it during encryption. Remove the separate
dkg_params construction if it is no longer needed.
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Cargo.tomlagent/CONTEXT.mdagent/flow-trace/04_DKG_AND_COMPUTATION.mdagent/flow-trace/07_UPGRADES.mdagent/invariants/02_CRYPTO_CIRCUITS.mdcircuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/benchmark_run_meta.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/crisp_verify_gas.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/integration_summary.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/report.mdcircuits/benchmarks/scripts/generate_report.shcircuits/lib/src/configs/committee/micro/parity_secure.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/committee/minimum/parity_secure.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/committee/small/parity_secure.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/insecure/dkg.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/insecure/threshold.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/secure/dkg.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/secure/threshold.nrcircuits/lib/src/core/dkg/share_encryption.nrcrates/config/protocol-release.tomlcrates/evm-helpers/src/contracts.rscrates/evm/src/interfold/events.rscrates/fhe-params/src/builder.rscrates/fhe-params/src/constants.rscrates/indexer/src/indexer.rscrates/indexer/tests/fixtures/fake_interfold.solcrates/polynomial/Cargo.tomlcrates/polynomial/src/crt_polynomial.rscrates/test-helpers/src/application.rscrates/test-helpers/src/usecase_helpers.rscrates/trbfv/src/gen_pk_share_and_sk_sss.rscrates/trbfv/src/helpers.rscrates/trbfv/src/shares/bfv_encrypted.rscrates/trbfv/src/trbfv_request.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/bin/compute_vk_hash.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_computation/computation.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_computation/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_decryption/computation.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_decryption/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_encryption/circuit.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_encryption/computation.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/dkg/share_encryption/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/decrypted_shares_aggregation/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/pk_generation/codegen.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/pk_generation/computation.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/pk_generation/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/share_decryption/sample.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/circuits/threshold/user_data_encryption/computation.rscrates/zk-helpers/src/math.rscrates/zk-prover/tests/common/node_fold_witness.rsexamples/CRISP/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/circuits/bin/crisp/src/main.nrexamples/CRISP/circuits/bin/crisp_onchain/src/main.nrexamples/CRISP/circuits/bin/fold/src/main.nrexamples/CRISP/circuits/bin/fold_onchain/src/main.nrexamples/CRISP/circuits/lib/src/utils.nrexamples/CRISP/crates/crisp-utils/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/crates/zk-inputs-wasm/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/crates/zk-inputs/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/crates/zk-inputs/src/lib.rsexamples/CRISP/packages/crisp-contracts/contracts/verifiers/CRISPOnchainVerifier.solexamples/CRISP/packages/crisp-contracts/contracts/verifiers/CRISPVerifier.solexamples/CRISP/program/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/server/Cargo.tomlexamples/CRISP/server/src/server/data_availability.rspackages/interfold-contracts/contracts/lib/ActiveCryptoConfig.solpackages/interfold-contracts/scripts/protocol/constants.tspackages/interfold-contracts/scripts/utils.tspackages/interfold-contracts/tasks/interfold.tspackages/interfold-contracts/test/Interfold.spec.tspackages/interfold-contracts/test/fixtures/bfv_vk_binding/folded_artifacts.jsonpackages/interfold-contracts/test/fixtures/constants.tspackages/interfold-sdk/src/utils.tspackages/interfold-sdk/tests/sdk.test.tsscripts/build-circuits.tsscripts/check-committee.shtemplates/default/Cargo.toml
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Inline comments:
In `@circuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/report.md`:
- Line 7: Update generate_report.sh to derive the committee size header from the
saved run configuration recorded in benchmark_run_meta.json, rather than the
active default committee, and regenerate report.md from that metadata.
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agent/flow-trace/04_DKG_AND_COMPUTATION.mdcircuits/benchmarks/results_insecure_minimum/report.mdcircuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/benchmark_run_meta.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/crisp_verify_gas.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/integration_summary.jsoncircuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/report.mdcircuits/benchmarks/scripts/benchmark_circuit.shcircuits/benchmarks/scripts/generate_report.shcircuits/benchmarks/scripts/run_benchmarks.shcircuits/bin/config/src/main.nrcircuits/lib/src/configs/secure/threshold.nrcrates/bfv-client/src/client.rsscripts/check-committee.sh
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Inline comments:
In `@scripts/circuit-artifacts.ts`:
- Around line 69-74: Update copyArtifactsInto to remove unsupported circuit
pairs from the cloned target before validateArtifactSet runs, so legacy pairs
with build stamps cannot cause validation to reject a publish. Preserve the six
RELEASE_REQUIRED_PAIRS and their copy behavior.
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ctrlc03
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0xjei
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this requires a protocol version change since we changed the parameter set.
0xjei
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Preserve the secure parameter-set migration while keeping main's sortition gap and proof-publication invariant. Use the current documentation paths for the address checker.
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`verify_user_data_encryption_bounds` re-derives the generated bounds independently of the Rust generator, so the two have to move together. Replaces the `r1` / `r2` / `p1` / `p2` checks with the two `r` bounds, deriving each from the reduced identity rather than the unreduced one — and noting why ct0 takes the lifted `e0_bound` rather than its residue at `q_i`, which is the part that would silently reject every honest witness if it regressed. This is the check that caught the `k1_max` off-by-one in the preceding commit. Pre-existing and untouched: `nargo execute` on bin/config still fails in `verify_e_sm_bound`, which hardcodes `e_norm = 20` and `sk_norm = PARAMS_SEARCH_N = 10` while the Rust uses the committee-derived values. Confirmed identical at 631fa55, before this work. `pnpm lint` only compiles this circuit, which is the bar this commit clears; #1996 fixes the assertion.
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C7 took `u_global` and per-basis `crt_quotients` as witnesses and checked `u_crt + r * q_l == u_global`, then decoded through `-Q^-1 * (t * u mod Q) mod t`. It now derives `u` instead. Lagrange coefficients come from a hinted modular inverse proven by `denominator * inverse == 1 (mod q_l)`, which replaces an in-circuit inversion; Garner reconstruction then gives the unique `u` in `[0, Q)` from the residues. Decoding is the standard rounded `round(t * u / Q)`, with `t` folding to zero, pinned by a quotient bound and the canonical remainder interval. Soundness. `u_global` and `crt_quotients` are gone, and with them the IF-012 quotient bound: `u` is derived, so there is no quotient for a prover to choose and nothing to bound. Each share is bounded to `[0, q_l)` directly, which the interpolation and the Garner step both read — strictly stronger than the IF-013 checked opening it replaces, and it makes the plain commitment injective again. Every division hint is proven by a bounded quotient plus a canonical remainder, so a bad hint cannot satisfy both. Generic in `L` and driven by four generated widths, so it runs on both presets and adapts to a new parameter set. The hints need their inputs under 128 bits; the worst case is the interpolation sum at `H * q^2`, which is 2^121 on the current secure moduli and 2^123 on those in #1996. `garner_reconstruct` asserts the running product fits, so a parameter set that broke this would fail loudly rather than mis-reduce. 112,591 -> 26,808 gates at secure-8192/minimum (-76.2%, -75.3% against main).
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The decode moved from `-Q^-1 * centered(t * u mod Q) mod t` to `round(t * u / Q)`, and a formula change deserves more than the one sampled witness per preset it had. Extracts it as `rounded_decode` so it can be exercised directly, and adds fifteen assertions at `Q = 1001`, `t = 10`: both endpoints, the exact encodings `u = round(Q * m / t)`, four transition pairs across the flip from `m` to `m + 1`, and the wrap at `u = 951` where the result rounds to exactly `t` and folds to zero. Every expected value was derived independently rather than read off the implementation. Two findings behind this, both stronger than the earlier commit message claimed. The old and new formulas are the *same function*, not merely equal on honest inputs: compared exhaustively over every `u` in `[0, Q)` across 44 parameter pairs, covering odd and even `Q`, `t` from 2 to 100, and `t | Q` both ways. Zero mismatches. On the real parameter sets — current secure, #1996's, and insecure — the endpoints, exact encodings and every transition point agree. And the new form is the one fhe.rs uses. Its threshold path scales by `ScalingFactor::new(t, Q)`, and the RNS scaler is defined as `round(numerator * input / denominator)`, so the circuit now mirrors the reference construction instead of an algebraic rearrangement of it. The end-to-end runs already tested this from the other direction: the witness generator takes its plaintext from fhe.rs and the circuit asserts the decode matches it. The wrap branch is load-bearing, not defensive: 4 of the boundary points on each real parameter set round to exactly `t`. Pure extraction — 26,808 gates unchanged, 160/160 tests.
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Groundwork for folding C3's `k0 * k1` term into the mod-q quotient. No circuit change yet: this derives the constants, emits them, and has bin/config re-derive them independently, so the arithmetic is pinned before any Noir code depends on it. The substitution is k1 = SCALE * m - T * z (z is the rounding carry) k0 * T = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => k0 * k1 = q * (ALPHA * m - BETA * z) - SMALL_D * m + z => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0 so the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison in compute_scaled_message are replaced by two scalar terms, and Q0 absorbs the rest. The win needs SMALL_D small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: DELTA = floor(prod(q)/T) is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(T)) * q, so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. ScaledQuotient::derive returns available: false rather than approximating, on four guards: DELTA < q, k not a power of two, SMALL_D <= 0, or either numerator not dividing q exactly. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so DELTA < q and it falls back -- the circuit will keep the direct k1 path there, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Derived widths reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes for this parameter set: BIT_Q0 = 27, BIT_Q0_DIFF = 19, BIT_Q1 = 14, and T = 2^57 + 25-bit gap. Reproducing hand-tuned constants from the identity's terms is the evidence the derivation is the real one. The offsets now have a reason too: 4097 = N * u / 2 + 1 is the negative excursion from the pk * u product, and the difference carries twice that because both limbs contribute one. #1996's parameters come out one bit tighter (26/18/13) and also satisfy every guard, so this serves both production sets. bin/config re-derives all of it. Verified by perturbing SMALL_D by one in a worktree, which produces "SHARE_ENCRYPTION_SMALL_D mismatch" -- the check runs rather than merely compiling. It sits in verify_dkg_bounds, ahead of the long-standing PK_GENERATION_E_SM_BOUND failure, so it is reached. BIT_Q0_DIFF is the one exception: it needs gap * msg at about 2^137, past u128, so the honest-witness check has to cover that width instead. Still unverified, and the gate on the circuit work: that a real honest witness satisfies these widths. A too-tight BIT_Q0 is a completeness bug that would only appear for particular messages.
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k1 is the message scaled by SCALE = Q mod t and centred modulo t. Writing that reduction as a carry makes it affine: k1 = SCALE * m - t * z k0 * t = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0, Q0 = r + ALPHA * m - BETA * z so the k0 * k1 term disappears into the quotient and k1 is never built. Measured (bb gates, secure-8192/minimum): 2,744,690 -> 2,125,396, -619,294 (-22.6%). Against origin/main, which measures 3,475,203, that is -38.8%. C3 runs about 1,512 times per DKG at the small committee -- one proof per (recipient, modulus) per chain, both chains, every node -- so this is roughly -936M gates per DKG, more than every other circuit on this branch combined. Most of the win is transcript rather than arithmetic. The direct path pushes all N coefficients of k1 into the sponge unpacked, one absorption each, and replaces ct0_r at 55 bits with Q0 at 27. Dropping the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison is the smaller half. Q0 is narrow because SMALL_D = k * q - floor(prod(q)/t) is small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: floor(prod(q)/t)/q is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(t)), so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. Widths come from the generator (43919f8) and reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes, 27/19/14; #1996 is tighter at 26/18/13. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so no k works and SCALED_QUOTIENT is generated false -- that preset keeps the direct path, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Gating on the generated flag rather than on N == 8192 && L == 2 means a new parameter set is included or excluded loudly, never handed wrong constants. z is a witness, not an in-circuit hint. Computing it with __compute_mod_reduction made nargo execute emit "bug: Brillig function call isn't properly covered by a manual constraint", the same diagnostic C6 hit. Supplying it and pinning it with the same two constraints -- a BIT_Z bound and the [0, t) window that exactly one z satisfies -- removes the diagnostic and matches how every other quotient here is handled. Verified: nargo execute solves against a real secure-8192 witness with no bug diagnostics, which also confirms an honest witness satisfies the derived 27/19/14 -- the completeness risk this change carried. The insecure fallback solves too. bin/config re-derives the constants ahead of its long-standing E_SM_BOUND failure, so that check is reached. Three new tests: the honest scaled path, and a deflated and an inflated carry, both rejected. The scaled test is the only one entering that branch; every pre-existing C3 test runs the fallback, so without it the shipped path would be the untested one.
ctrlc03
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`verify_user_data_encryption_bounds` re-derives the generated bounds independently of the Rust generator, so the two have to move together. Replaces the `r1` / `r2` / `p1` / `p2` checks with the two `r` bounds, deriving each from the reduced identity rather than the unreduced one — and noting why ct0 takes the lifted `e0_bound` rather than its residue at `q_i`, which is the part that would silently reject every honest witness if it regressed. This is the check that caught the `k1_max` off-by-one in the preceding commit. Pre-existing and untouched: `nargo execute` on bin/config still fails in `verify_e_sm_bound`, which hardcodes `e_norm = 20` and `sk_norm = PARAMS_SEARCH_N = 10` while the Rust uses the committee-derived values. Confirmed identical at 631fa55, before this work. `pnpm lint` only compiles this circuit, which is the bar this commit clears; #1996 fixes the assertion.
ctrlc03
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Oct 2, 2026
C7 took `u_global` and per-basis `crt_quotients` as witnesses and checked `u_crt + r * q_l == u_global`, then decoded through `-Q^-1 * (t * u mod Q) mod t`. It now derives `u` instead. Lagrange coefficients come from a hinted modular inverse proven by `denominator * inverse == 1 (mod q_l)`, which replaces an in-circuit inversion; Garner reconstruction then gives the unique `u` in `[0, Q)` from the residues. Decoding is the standard rounded `round(t * u / Q)`, with `t` folding to zero, pinned by a quotient bound and the canonical remainder interval. Soundness. `u_global` and `crt_quotients` are gone, and with them the IF-012 quotient bound: `u` is derived, so there is no quotient for a prover to choose and nothing to bound. Each share is bounded to `[0, q_l)` directly, which the interpolation and the Garner step both read — strictly stronger than the IF-013 checked opening it replaces, and it makes the plain commitment injective again. Every division hint is proven by a bounded quotient plus a canonical remainder, so a bad hint cannot satisfy both. Generic in `L` and driven by four generated widths, so it runs on both presets and adapts to a new parameter set. The hints need their inputs under 128 bits; the worst case is the interpolation sum at `H * q^2`, which is 2^121 on the current secure moduli and 2^123 on those in #1996. `garner_reconstruct` asserts the running product fits, so a parameter set that broke this would fail loudly rather than mis-reduce. 112,591 -> 26,808 gates at secure-8192/minimum (-76.2%, -75.3% against main).
ctrlc03
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The decode moved from `-Q^-1 * centered(t * u mod Q) mod t` to `round(t * u / Q)`, and a formula change deserves more than the one sampled witness per preset it had. Extracts it as `rounded_decode` so it can be exercised directly, and adds fifteen assertions at `Q = 1001`, `t = 10`: both endpoints, the exact encodings `u = round(Q * m / t)`, four transition pairs across the flip from `m` to `m + 1`, and the wrap at `u = 951` where the result rounds to exactly `t` and folds to zero. Every expected value was derived independently rather than read off the implementation. Two findings behind this, both stronger than the earlier commit message claimed. The old and new formulas are the *same function*, not merely equal on honest inputs: compared exhaustively over every `u` in `[0, Q)` across 44 parameter pairs, covering odd and even `Q`, `t` from 2 to 100, and `t | Q` both ways. Zero mismatches. On the real parameter sets — current secure, #1996's, and insecure — the endpoints, exact encodings and every transition point agree. And the new form is the one fhe.rs uses. Its threshold path scales by `ScalingFactor::new(t, Q)`, and the RNS scaler is defined as `round(numerator * input / denominator)`, so the circuit now mirrors the reference construction instead of an algebraic rearrangement of it. The end-to-end runs already tested this from the other direction: the witness generator takes its plaintext from fhe.rs and the circuit asserts the decode matches it. The wrap branch is load-bearing, not defensive: 4 of the boundary points on each real parameter set round to exactly `t`. Pure extraction — 26,808 gates unchanged, 160/160 tests.
ctrlc03
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Groundwork for folding C3's `k0 * k1` term into the mod-q quotient. No circuit change yet: this derives the constants, emits them, and has bin/config re-derive them independently, so the arithmetic is pinned before any Noir code depends on it. The substitution is k1 = SCALE * m - T * z (z is the rounding carry) k0 * T = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => k0 * k1 = q * (ALPHA * m - BETA * z) - SMALL_D * m + z => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0 so the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison in compute_scaled_message are replaced by two scalar terms, and Q0 absorbs the rest. The win needs SMALL_D small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: DELTA = floor(prod(q)/T) is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(T)) * q, so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. ScaledQuotient::derive returns available: false rather than approximating, on four guards: DELTA < q, k not a power of two, SMALL_D <= 0, or either numerator not dividing q exactly. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so DELTA < q and it falls back -- the circuit will keep the direct k1 path there, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Derived widths reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes for this parameter set: BIT_Q0 = 27, BIT_Q0_DIFF = 19, BIT_Q1 = 14, and T = 2^57 + 25-bit gap. Reproducing hand-tuned constants from the identity's terms is the evidence the derivation is the real one. The offsets now have a reason too: 4097 = N * u / 2 + 1 is the negative excursion from the pk * u product, and the difference carries twice that because both limbs contribute one. #1996's parameters come out one bit tighter (26/18/13) and also satisfy every guard, so this serves both production sets. bin/config re-derives all of it. Verified by perturbing SMALL_D by one in a worktree, which produces "SHARE_ENCRYPTION_SMALL_D mismatch" -- the check runs rather than merely compiling. It sits in verify_dkg_bounds, ahead of the long-standing PK_GENERATION_E_SM_BOUND failure, so it is reached. BIT_Q0_DIFF is the one exception: it needs gap * msg at about 2^137, past u128, so the honest-witness check has to cover that width instead. Still unverified, and the gate on the circuit work: that a real honest witness satisfies these widths. A too-tight BIT_Q0 is a completeness bug that would only appear for particular messages.
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Oct 2, 2026
k1 is the message scaled by SCALE = Q mod t and centred modulo t. Writing that reduction as a carry makes it affine: k1 = SCALE * m - t * z k0 * t = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0, Q0 = r + ALPHA * m - BETA * z so the k0 * k1 term disappears into the quotient and k1 is never built. Measured (bb gates, secure-8192/minimum): 2,744,690 -> 2,125,396, -619,294 (-22.6%). Against origin/main, which measures 3,475,203, that is -38.8%. C3 runs about 1,512 times per DKG at the small committee -- one proof per (recipient, modulus) per chain, both chains, every node -- so this is roughly -936M gates per DKG, more than every other circuit on this branch combined. Most of the win is transcript rather than arithmetic. The direct path pushes all N coefficients of k1 into the sponge unpacked, one absorption each, and replaces ct0_r at 55 bits with Q0 at 27. Dropping the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison is the smaller half. Q0 is narrow because SMALL_D = k * q - floor(prod(q)/t) is small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: floor(prod(q)/t)/q is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(t)), so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. Widths come from the generator (43919f8) and reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes, 27/19/14; #1996 is tighter at 26/18/13. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so no k works and SCALED_QUOTIENT is generated false -- that preset keeps the direct path, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Gating on the generated flag rather than on N == 8192 && L == 2 means a new parameter set is included or excluded loudly, never handed wrong constants. z is a witness, not an in-circuit hint. Computing it with __compute_mod_reduction made nargo execute emit "bug: Brillig function call isn't properly covered by a manual constraint", the same diagnostic C6 hit. Supplying it and pinning it with the same two constraints -- a BIT_Z bound and the [0, t) window that exactly one z satisfies -- removes the diagnostic and matches how every other quotient here is handled. Verified: nargo execute solves against a real secure-8192 witness with no bug diagnostics, which also confirms an honest witness satisfies the derived 27/19/14 -- the completeness risk this change carried. The insecure fallback solves too. bin/config re-derives the constants ahead of its long-standing E_SM_BOUND failure, so that check is reached. Three new tests: the honest scaled path, and a deflated and an inflated carry, both rejected. The scaled test is the only one entering that branch; every pre-existing C3 test runs the fallback, so without it the shipped path would be the untested one.
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`verify_user_data_encryption_bounds` re-derives the generated bounds independently of the Rust generator, so the two have to move together. Replaces the `r1` / `r2` / `p1` / `p2` checks with the two `r` bounds, deriving each from the reduced identity rather than the unreduced one — and noting why ct0 takes the lifted `e0_bound` rather than its residue at `q_i`, which is the part that would silently reject every honest witness if it regressed. This is the check that caught the `k1_max` off-by-one in the preceding commit. Pre-existing and untouched: `nargo execute` on bin/config still fails in `verify_e_sm_bound`, which hardcodes `e_norm = 20` and `sk_norm = PARAMS_SEARCH_N = 10` while the Rust uses the committee-derived values. Confirmed identical at 631fa55, before this work. `pnpm lint` only compiles this circuit, which is the bar this commit clears; #1996 fixes the assertion.
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C7 took `u_global` and per-basis `crt_quotients` as witnesses and checked `u_crt + r * q_l == u_global`, then decoded through `-Q^-1 * (t * u mod Q) mod t`. It now derives `u` instead. Lagrange coefficients come from a hinted modular inverse proven by `denominator * inverse == 1 (mod q_l)`, which replaces an in-circuit inversion; Garner reconstruction then gives the unique `u` in `[0, Q)` from the residues. Decoding is the standard rounded `round(t * u / Q)`, with `t` folding to zero, pinned by a quotient bound and the canonical remainder interval. Soundness. `u_global` and `crt_quotients` are gone, and with them the IF-012 quotient bound: `u` is derived, so there is no quotient for a prover to choose and nothing to bound. Each share is bounded to `[0, q_l)` directly, which the interpolation and the Garner step both read — strictly stronger than the IF-013 checked opening it replaces, and it makes the plain commitment injective again. Every division hint is proven by a bounded quotient plus a canonical remainder, so a bad hint cannot satisfy both. Generic in `L` and driven by four generated widths, so it runs on both presets and adapts to a new parameter set. The hints need their inputs under 128 bits; the worst case is the interpolation sum at `H * q^2`, which is 2^121 on the current secure moduli and 2^123 on those in #1996. `garner_reconstruct` asserts the running product fits, so a parameter set that broke this would fail loudly rather than mis-reduce. 112,591 -> 26,808 gates at secure-8192/minimum (-76.2%, -75.3% against main).
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The decode moved from `-Q^-1 * centered(t * u mod Q) mod t` to `round(t * u / Q)`, and a formula change deserves more than the one sampled witness per preset it had. Extracts it as `rounded_decode` so it can be exercised directly, and adds fifteen assertions at `Q = 1001`, `t = 10`: both endpoints, the exact encodings `u = round(Q * m / t)`, four transition pairs across the flip from `m` to `m + 1`, and the wrap at `u = 951` where the result rounds to exactly `t` and folds to zero. Every expected value was derived independently rather than read off the implementation. Two findings behind this, both stronger than the earlier commit message claimed. The old and new formulas are the *same function*, not merely equal on honest inputs: compared exhaustively over every `u` in `[0, Q)` across 44 parameter pairs, covering odd and even `Q`, `t` from 2 to 100, and `t | Q` both ways. Zero mismatches. On the real parameter sets — current secure, #1996's, and insecure — the endpoints, exact encodings and every transition point agree. And the new form is the one fhe.rs uses. Its threshold path scales by `ScalingFactor::new(t, Q)`, and the RNS scaler is defined as `round(numerator * input / denominator)`, so the circuit now mirrors the reference construction instead of an algebraic rearrangement of it. The end-to-end runs already tested this from the other direction: the witness generator takes its plaintext from fhe.rs and the circuit asserts the decode matches it. The wrap branch is load-bearing, not defensive: 4 of the boundary points on each real parameter set round to exactly `t`. Pure extraction — 26,808 gates unchanged, 160/160 tests.
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Groundwork for folding C3's `k0 * k1` term into the mod-q quotient. No circuit change yet: this derives the constants, emits them, and has bin/config re-derive them independently, so the arithmetic is pinned before any Noir code depends on it. The substitution is k1 = SCALE * m - T * z (z is the rounding carry) k0 * T = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => k0 * k1 = q * (ALPHA * m - BETA * z) - SMALL_D * m + z => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0 so the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison in compute_scaled_message are replaced by two scalar terms, and Q0 absorbs the rest. The win needs SMALL_D small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: DELTA = floor(prod(q)/T) is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(T)) * q, so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. ScaledQuotient::derive returns available: false rather than approximating, on four guards: DELTA < q, k not a power of two, SMALL_D <= 0, or either numerator not dividing q exactly. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so DELTA < q and it falls back -- the circuit will keep the direct k1 path there, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Derived widths reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes for this parameter set: BIT_Q0 = 27, BIT_Q0_DIFF = 19, BIT_Q1 = 14, and T = 2^57 + 25-bit gap. Reproducing hand-tuned constants from the identity's terms is the evidence the derivation is the real one. The offsets now have a reason too: 4097 = N * u / 2 + 1 is the negative excursion from the pk * u product, and the difference carries twice that because both limbs contribute one. #1996's parameters come out one bit tighter (26/18/13) and also satisfy every guard, so this serves both production sets. bin/config re-derives all of it. Verified by perturbing SMALL_D by one in a worktree, which produces "SHARE_ENCRYPTION_SMALL_D mismatch" -- the check runs rather than merely compiling. It sits in verify_dkg_bounds, ahead of the long-standing PK_GENERATION_E_SM_BOUND failure, so it is reached. BIT_Q0_DIFF is the one exception: it needs gap * msg at about 2^137, past u128, so the honest-witness check has to cover that width instead. Still unverified, and the gate on the circuit work: that a real honest witness satisfies these widths. A too-tight BIT_Q0 is a completeness bug that would only appear for particular messages.
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k1 is the message scaled by SCALE = Q mod t and centred modulo t. Writing that reduction as a carry makes it affine: k1 = SCALE * m - t * z k0 * t = BETA * q - 1 k0 * SCALE = ALPHA * q - SMALL_D => ct0 = pk0 * u + e0 - SMALL_D * m + z + q * Q0, Q0 = r + ALPHA * m - BETA * z so the k0 * k1 term disappears into the quotient and k1 is never built. Measured (bb gates, secure-8192/minimum): 2,744,690 -> 2,125,396, -619,294 (-22.6%). Against origin/main, which measures 3,475,203, that is -38.8%. C3 runs about 1,512 times per DKG at the small committee -- one proof per (recipient, modulus) per chain, both chains, every node -- so this is roughly -936M gates per DKG, more than every other circuit on this branch combined. Most of the win is transcript rather than arithmetic. The direct path pushes all N coefficients of k1 into the sponge unpacked, one absorption each, and replaces ct0_r at 55 bits with Q0 at 27. Dropping the per-coefficient modular multiply and centring comparison is the smaller half. Q0 is narrow because SMALL_D = k * q - floor(prod(q)/t) is small, which holds because every modulus sits just above a power of two: floor(prod(q)/t)/q is then close to 2^(bits(q) - bits(t)), so k is that power of two and SMALL_D is only as large as the moduli's gaps. Widths come from the generator (43919f8) and reproduce what feat/secure-circuit-optimizations hardcodes, 27/19/14; #1996 is tighter at 26/18/13. insecure-512 has one DKG modulus, so no k works and SCALED_QUOTIENT is generated false -- that preset keeps the direct path, which is fine for a test-only parameter set. Gating on the generated flag rather than on N == 8192 && L == 2 means a new parameter set is included or excluded loudly, never handed wrong constants. z is a witness, not an in-circuit hint. Computing it with __compute_mod_reduction made nargo execute emit "bug: Brillig function call isn't properly covered by a manual constraint", the same diagnostic C6 hit. Supplying it and pinning it with the same two constraints -- a BIT_Z bound and the [0, t) window that exactly one z satisfies -- removes the diagnostic and matches how every other quotient here is handled. Verified: nargo execute solves against a real secure-8192 witness with no bug diagnostics, which also confirms an honest witness satisfies the derived 27/19/14 -- the completeness risk this change carried. The insecure fallback solves too. bin/config re-derives the constants ahead of its long-standing E_SM_BOUND failure, so that check is reached. Three new tests: the honest scaled path, and a deflated and an inflated carry, both rejected. The scaled test is the only one entering that branch; every pre-existing C3 test runs the fallback, so without it the shipped path would be the untested one.
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Summary
protocol_versionto 5 and change the circuit ID domain tointerfold-bfv-v2for both presets. Old clients must use the new configuration IDs for new requests.Validation
--multithread-jobs 2 --verbose. All 11 raw circuit benchmarks passed. A fresh two-job integration export completed in 165.10 s with matching tallies and successful EVM replay. Measured verifier gas: Π_DKG 3,125,145, Π_user 3,034,178, Π_dec 3,716,640. The machine-readable gas JSON records zero exit codes for all three extraction stages.--multithread-jobs 2 --verbose. All 12 selected raw entries, including the config check and C7, verified. The integration test completed in 627.79 s with tallies 15/15, 13/13, and 16/16. EVM replay succeeded; measured verifier gas: Π_DKG 3,125,230, Π_user 3,034,226, Π_dec 3,716,652. All three gas-extraction stages exited with code zero. Seecircuits/benchmarks/results_secure_minimum/report.md.e3-bfv-clientunit suite passes after removing an unstable serialization assertion. The branch now includes the secure benchmark fix and results.dddbfe9b327538d5. The DKG/decryption verifier checks pass for the rebuilt committee routes. The circuit-tooling suite passes all 10 tests, including generated-bound hash stability and supported-pair publication.Rollout
Pause and drain active E3s before the protocol-version-5 cutover. Install matching circuit artifacts and verifier routes before new requests resume.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
Documentation