fix(security): role-gate WhatsApp account routes (decrypted-token exposure) - #4
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…osure) whatsappAccounts.js shipped a stub adminOnly that only checked req.user (a stale 'roles were removed' assumption). The system does have roles (admin/bda_sales/viewer, permissions.js + migration 031), so any logged-in non-admin could read a live, DECRYPTED Meta access token via GET /api/whatsapp-accounts/:id?reveal=1, and create/update/delete accounts. Use the role-gated adminOnly from middleware/access.js for :id (reveal), POST, PUT, DELETE. The list and by-phone picker routes stay open to all authenticated users since they return masked metadata only (no token). Audit ref: REVIEW.md P0 #1 (lane 02 CRITICAL + HIGHs). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: KingArthur000 <sathyaprakashelango@gmail.com>
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… deploy docs (#5) Batch D — 5 audit Criticals + related: - auth.js/crypto.js: production guards now reject the .env.example placeholder secrets and any value < 32 chars (not just the empty/dev-default), so a self-hoster copying .env.example unchanged can't run prod with public keys. - .env.example: add POSTGRES_PASSWORD (+ matching DATABASE_URL) and META_APP_SECRET; document the >=32-char / no-placeholder requirement + openssl generation. - Caddyfile: replace the real domain forgechat.akilsadik.live with forgechat.example.com + an explicit 'replace with your domain' note. - DEPLOY.md: fix wrong env var names (FORGECRM_JWT_SECRET -> JWT_SECRET, FORGECRM_META_WEBHOOK_VERIFY_TOKEN -> META_WEBHOOK_VERIFY_TOKEN), drop the unused COOKIE_PARENT_DOMAINS, add POSTGRES_PASSWORD/META_APP_SECRET. - admin seed: write the generated one-time password to a 0600 file instead of stdout (avoids credential persistence in log aggregators). - health check: backend route is /health (not /api/health); add an nginx location so it's reachable externally, and fix both deploy guides' smoke test. Audit refs: REVIEW.md P0 #4,#5,#6,#7,#8 (lanes 04,24,25). Signed-off-by: KingArthur000 <sathyaprakashelango@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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P0 #1 from the security audit (lane 02, CRITICAL).
whatsappAccounts.jsused a stubadminOnlythat only checkedreq.user(a stale 'roles were removed' note), so any authenticated non-admin could:GET /api/whatsapp-accounts/:id?reveal=1Fix: use the role-gated
adminOnlyfrommiddleware/access.json:id(reveal)/POST/PUT/DELETE. Thelistandby-phonepicker routes stay open to all authenticated users — they return masked metadata only, no token.